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Non-Technical Summary
The present paper assesses the likely consequences of EU enlargement for East
West migration. Beyond the mere reduction of moving costs we identify several
aspects of EU membership that may inuence migration decisions. First some
macroeconomic and political factors connected with the EU membership issue
are discussed. We argue that dierent developments of East-West European
income gaps as well as Western European immigration policy can be expected,
depending on whether an Eastern European country is or is not granted EU
membership. Secondly, the inuence of these factors on migration decisions is
formalized using a microeconomic model that focuses on the expected future
immigration policy as a determinant of individual migration decisions. The model
shows that in view of the expected liberalization of immigration policy in case of
an EU membership, migration decisions of Eastern European citizens are likely
to be postponed or even cancelled. By contrast, if EU membership is refused,
fear of future restrictions on immigration will lead to early migration decisions
and increase current migration ows. Finally, some casual evidence drawing on
the experiences of the EU South enlargement in the 1980s is considered. We
examine the development of per capita income and migration ows of Spain,
Portugal and Greece in the period following their joining of the EU. The data
show that in the aftermath of the EU South enlargement no drastic increases
in migration ows could be observed. On the contrary, in all three cases net
emigration has since then substantially declined. We conclude that granting
EU accession to Eastern European countries will not necessarily induce massive
East-West migration ows. On the contrary, if macroeconomic and political
determinants of migration behaviour are taken into account a decline in migration
is likely to occur.
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Abstract
This paper assesses the consequences of EU enlargement for East West
migration. In the theoretical part, we identify several factors in addi-
tion to the reduction of moving costs by which EU membership inuences
migration. Specically, EU accession aects income gaps. Moreover, if
EU membership is refused, fear of future restrictions on immigration will
lead to increased current migration. Additionally, casual evidence from
the 1980s EU South enlargement is examined. Since then no increases in
migration ows from Spain, Portugal and Greece were observed. We con-
clude that granting EU accession to Eastern European countries will not
necessarily induce massive East-West migration ows.
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1 Introduction
The applications for EU membership of several Eastern European countries have
raised concerns about an uncontrolled increase in East-West migration ows,
leading to rising unemployment and an erosion of Western welfare states.
1
Per-
spectives of that kind are supported by microeconomic models in the tradition
of Hicks (1932) and Harris/Todaro (1970). According to this approach, migra-
tion decisions are primarily determined by the income gains net of migration
costs that can be expected when moving to the destination country. At prevail-
ing dierences in wages and social security benets between Eastern and Western
European countries, an EU East enlargement would facilitate factor mobility and
reduce migration costs, thus encouraging East-West migration.
According to this line of argument, however, the only consequence of an EU
membership taken into account is the reduction of direct migration costs, im-
plicitly assuming that all other circumstances either remain unchanged or do not
inuence individual migration decisions. By contrast, in recent interdisciplinary
migration models it is argued that analyzing isolated individuals is not suÆ-
cient to explain actual migration ows, and that, apart from the direct migration
gains and costs, macroeconomic, social and political factors are important deter-
minants of migration behaviour.
2
In particular, political events such as joining
the EU inuence expectations on future migration options which in turn aect
the incentives for immediate emigration. In addition, expected macroeconomic
and political developments in the country of origin inuence individual migra-
tion decisions. Whereas in the case of a positive decision on the application for
membership a more liberal immigration policy and a catch-up process in Eastern
European per capita income are likely to occur, restrictions on immigration and
widening income gaps may be anticipated if the application is turned down.
Taking into account these eects, the present paper assesses the likely conse-
quences of EU enlargement for East West migration. We conclude that granting
EU accession to Eastern European countries will not necessarily induce mas-
sive East-West migration ows. On the contrary, if macroeconomic and political
determinants of migration behaviour are taken into account a decline in migra-
tion is likely to occur. To arrive at this conclusion, we combine three dierent
approaches. Firstly, in the following section some macroeconomic and political
factors connected with the EU membership issue are discussed in an informal way.
Specically, we argue that dierent developments of East-West European income
gaps as well as Western European immigration policy can be expected, depending
on whether an Eastern European country is or is not granted EU membership.
Secondly, in section 3 the inuence of these factors on migration decisions is for-
malized using a microeconomic model. Drawing on Burda's (1995) work on the
1
cf. e.g. Sinn (1999), (1998:125 .), Layard et al. (1992).
2
cf. e.g. Faist (1998), Hammar and Tamas (1997), Massey et al. (1993).
1
option value of waiting we develop a two-period migration model that takes into
account uncertainty about the possible future gains from migration. Whereas
Burda concentrates on the inuence of expected income gaps on migration, we
mainly focus on the expected future immigration policy as a determinant of indi-
vidual migration decisions. The model shows that in view of the liberalization of
immigration policy expected in case of an EU membership, migration decisions
of Eastern European citizens are likely to be postponed or even cancelled. By
contrast, if EU membership is refused, fear of future restrictions on immigra-
tion will lead to early migration decisions and increase current migration ows.
3
Section 4 nally considers some casual evidence drawing on the experiences of
the EU South enlargement in the 1980s. We examine the development of per
capita income and migration ows of Spain, Portugal and Greece in the period
following their joining the EU. The data show that in the aftermath of the EU
South enlargement no drastic increases in migration ows were observed. On the
contrary, in all three cases net emigration has since then substantially declined.
Section 5 summarizes the results.
2 Macroeconomic and political aspects of EU
accession and migration behaviour
For the migration decision of an Eastern European citizen the future development
that can be expected in the case of a positive or negative decision on the EU
application for membership of her home country is relevant. Since the possible
future development in the case of a successful or unsuccessful application as well
as the EU accession itself is uncertain, in deciding on migration several risk
factors must be taken into account. With respect to migration decisions under
risk Burda
4
and Siebert
5
have noted the possibility of an option value of waiting:
It is argued that in view of uncertain future income gaps between home and
destination country it may be rational to postpone the migration decision in
order to acquire new information in the course of waiting. Migration in this kind
of model is undertaken only if the income gap is seen to widen, whereas in the case
of a narrowing income gap the migration decision will be cancelled.
6
Aggregate
migration ows are therefore positively related to expected income gaps and will
diminish if a convergence of incomes at home and abroad is anticipated but
increase if incomes are expected to diverge.
This so-called option value of waiting, however, presupposes that migration
may be postponed without additional costs, i.e. it takes future migration op-
3
Akerlof et al. (1991: 44) mentions a similar point with respect to the migration ows from
East to West Germany immediately preceding unication.
4
cf. Burda (1995).
5
cf. Siebert (1993).
6
cf. Burda (1995: 5 .).
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portunities for granted.
7
If instead a more restrictive immigration policy of the
host country is imminent and the potential migrant must consider the possibility
that future migration will become considerably more diÆcult or even impossible,
the value of the waiting option may be reversed and it may become rational to
migrate immediately. Apart from future macroeconomic developments expected
changes in immigration policy are therefore an additional important aspect in
migration decisions, and present aggregate immigration ows will be the higher
the more restrictive future immigration legislation is anticipated to be.
Furthermore, political migration theories emphasize the relationship between
migration and political participation, arguing that citizens' dissatisfaction with
the situation in their home country may be expressed either by voice (voting
behaviour) or by exit (leaving the country).
8
While voice is the normal type
of political protest, if individuals are unable to inuence their situation by vot-
ing they may resort to migration into another country. In particular, repressive
regimes leaving no opportunity to express dissatisfaction by voice will experience
more emigration than democratic states based on multiparty systems and sus-
tained by welfare provisions. In the process of democratization emigration can
therefore be expected to decline. Finally, political scientists point out that po-
litical and social instability in their home country may induce people to migrate
for reasons of security.
9
Turning to the issue of European East-West migration, dierent developments
of Eastern European income levels and Western European immigration policy can
be expected, depending on whether the decision on an application for member-
ship is favourable or unfavourable. Consider rst the possible consequences of
a positive decision on the application of an Eastern European country. In this
case support for the assumption of a narrowing East-West income gap may be
drawn from the hypotheses of catching-up and convergence clubs known from
macroeconomic growth theories. The catching-up hypothesis, most notedly rep-
resented by Abramovitz
10
, is concerned with the explanation of diverging and
converging processes of economic growth. It states that economies characterized
by a productivity lag (the so-called laggards) with respect to the technologically
leading nations (the so-called industrial leaders) have the opportunity of rapid
catching-up processes. The productivity gap is explained by the prevalence of a
comparatively obsolete stock of capital embodying out-dated technological know-
how. By importing modern capital goods from the industrial leaders it is thus
possible to achieve considerable technological leaps.
11
Additional factors such as
7
cf. Burda (1995: 5).
8
See Ahmed (1997: 174 f.).
9
cf. e.g. Ahmed (1997: 171 .), Faist (1997: 259 f., 271 f.).
10
see, for example, Abramovitz (1986), (1990), (1991).
11
The argument is thus based on the presumption known from vintage models that the most
recently implemented capital goods embody the present state of technological know-how (see
Abramovitz (1986: 221), Seiter (1997: 69)).
3
a high amount of hidden unemployment in the agricultural sector may help to
enhance overall productivity in the catch-up process.
However, not all countries exhibiting large productivity gaps are capable of
actually realizing that kind of rapid growth potential. The economy in question
must be able to successfully implement and apply the technological know-how
imported from the leader countries. The preconditions for this are summarized
by the concept of social capability and include the level of education, the char-
acteristics of nancial, political and social institutions as well as the intensity of
trade relations with the industrial leaders. In the course of catching up the social
capability of the laggard countries is expected to improve, thus creating a pos-
itive feedback eect accelerating the catch-up process. Empirical investigations
indicate that convergence of per capita income levels is observable only among
economies comparable with respect to their level of education, political institu-
tions etc. Accordingly so-called convergence clubs may be empirically identied,
12
exhibiting convergence of per capita incomes at the level of the respective leader
economies.
13
The current EU member states form a relatively homogeneous group of econo-
mies that may be regarded as a convergence club. For an Eastern European
country characterized by a technological lag but with suÆciently developed social
capability accession to the EU may make it possible to join the EU convergence
club and will crucially improve its chances for rapid growth. If the decision on
membership is favourable faster growth of per capita incomes and closing up to
Western European income levels can therefore be expected. Since macroeconomic
and developmental migration theories indicate that the developmental lags be-
tween home and host country incentivate migration,
14
anticipated convergence
decreases future income advantages from migration and discourages decisions to
leave.
15
With regard to the political and social aspects inuencing migration behaviour
it is safe to assume that if EU membership is granted Western European immigra-
tion policy will be liberalized with respect to Eastern European immigrants. It
is well known that the Treaty establishing the European Community grants free
movement of workers and their dependants as well as freedom of establishment
in other member states.
16
In case EU membership is granted, potential Eastern
European migrants need no longer fear possible future restrictions of Western
immigration policy and thus have no incentive to migrate early.
12
cf. e.g. Baumol/Wol (1988), Baumol/Blackman/Wol, (1989, Ch. 5), Bau-
mol/Nelson/Wol (1994).
13
The phenomenon of convergence clubs is connected with the existence of multiple equilibria
in the sense of dierent steady state growth paths that dene attractor states for growth
processes of the economies belonging to the various convergence clubs.
14
see Fischer, Martin and Straubhaar (1997b), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995: 288).
15
cf. Fischer, Martin and Straubhaar (1997a: 86).
16
cf. Treaty establishing the European Community, Art. 39, Par. 1, Art. 43.
4
The guarantee of free movement also entails the abolition of any discrimina-
tion based on nationality as well as administrative practices forming an obstacle
to worker's migration.
17
Accordingly, in the course of European harmonization
gradual adjustments of Eastern European social security systems to Western Eu-
ropean levels are likely to occur. Moreover, the Treaty supposes community
policy to contribute to the development and consolidation of democracy and the
rule of law as well as the respect for human rights and fundamental freedom.
18
EU membership can therefore be expected to support the process of democra-
tization. In most Eastern European countries a return to socialist regimes is
highly unlikely. However, as in Turkey, the stabilizing eect of EU membership
is certainly important. With rising per capital income, enhanced social security
systems and increased political and social stability migration becomes less at-
tractive. The anticipated favourable political and social circumstances will thus
further diminish East-West migration ows.
Consider, by contrast, the likely developments if the EU membership applica-
tion is rejected. According to the convergence clubs hypothesis we may assume
that similar to the current EU member states, the post-socialist Eastern Eu-
ropean countries also constitute a homogeneous group of economies exhibiting
convergence at a lower level of per capita income. If an Eastern country is not
granted membership, its growth performance may remain limited by the possi-
bilities of the Eastern convergence club and be expected to further diverge from
Western European levels. Anticipated divergence will increase the possible gains
from migration and provide an incentive to leave for better opportunities in the
West.
Political and social aspects may help to encourage migration plans. If more
and more people are seen to leave the East for economic reasons, concerns of mass
immigration may induce Western European countries to restrict immigration,
thus causing further migration waves for fears that in the future immigration
might no longer be an option. Dissatisfaction with economic performance, lack
of social security support and an increasing number of migrants may contribute
to destabilize the political and social situation and help to encourage decisions
to leave. Western immigration policy designed to limit migration may thus,
paradoxically, give rise to even greater migration ows. We conclude that, if the
application for membership is rejected, an increase in the number of migrants is
likely to occur.
17
cf. Treaty establishing the European Community, Art. 40.
18
Art. 177, Par. 2.
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3 A model of migration decision under uncer-
tainty
To formalize the interaction of growth prospects, immigration policy and mi-
gration decisions, we use a model with two countries. The \origin" country
represents the prospective EU members, and the \destination" country stands
for the EU. The model extends over two periods t = 1; 2, during each of which
migration from the origin to the destination country may occur. There are two
kinds of uncertainty in the model, the rst relating to the second period income,
the second concerning the destination country's immigration policy.
3.1 The emigration decision
Residents of the origin country are induced to migrate by dierentials in living
standards. Such a dierence occurring in period t = 1; 2 is denoted by w
t
.
While it is most natural to think of this variable as a wage dierential, one may
equally well interpret it as a dierence in welfare benets, or even in kind transfers
such as public schools or housing. For the sake of brevity, we call w
t
the income
dierential. In this notation, a positive value of w
t
indicates that in period t
the income is higher in the destination country than in the home country.
We assume that the second period income dierential can take on two values.
With probability p; 0 < p < 1; it is w
+
2
; and with the remaining probability 1 p
it is w
 
2
; with 0  w
 
2
< w
+
2
. Thus, w
 
2
stands for the state of nature where
the origin country prospers and thereby catches up to the destination country.
On the other hand, w
+
2
represents either a severe economic downturn of the
origin country or substantial growth restricted to the destination country alone.
We denote by Ew
2
= pw
+
2
+ (1  p)w
 
2
the expected income dierential.
Turning to the second source of uncertainty, we assume that the authorities of
the destination country may impose a more restrictive immigration policy at the
beginning of period 2 and denote the probability that emigration is still possible
in period 2 by ; 0 <   1.
19
Migration is costly. The moving costs encompass the monetary and time costs
of traveling and shipping property, but, more importantly, they also reect the
monetary equivalent of non-pecuniary utility losses incurred by moving. For ex-
ample, such losses may be due to personal acquaintances or an aection for one's
home region. We assume a continuum of individuals residing in the origin coun-
try who dier with respect to their moving costs m: The cumulative distribution
function of m is F (m) with a density f(m)  F
0
(m): It is assumed that f(m)
19
This probability may be interpreted in two ways. First, with probability , the border
may be closed for all those who desire to immigrate. Second, only a (randomly chosen) frac-
tion  of such persons will be admitted. From the individual emigrant's point of view, both
interpretations are equivalent, since her own chance of being admitted is always given by :
6
is positive on [w
 
2
;w
+
2
], and zero otherwise.
20
Finally, all costs and benets
occurring in period t = 2 are discounted with the interest rate r > 0:
An agent living in the origin country may emigrate in the rst period, or stay
until period 2 and then decide whether to migrate.
21
An agent emigrating in the
rst period is not aected by a closing of the border occurring later on.
22
She
incurs moving costs in the rst period and obtains the income dierential in both
periods. Since the future income dierential is unknown ex ante, the relevant
gure is its expected value. Altogether, the present value of the expected utility
gain from moving in the rst period is
w
1
+
Ew
2
1 + r
 m:
For agents having decided to stay in the rst period the state of nature in
period 2 is revealed before the second period decision is taken. Accordingly, the
second period choice may depend on the realization of the income dierential.
Assuming that in the second period moving costs only accrue if the agent is
allowed to immigrate, it is optimal to plan emigration if the income dierential
exceeds the moving costs, i.e. if and only if the income dierential is high. This
rule describes the desired action of the agent, not her actual behaviour. Only if
she happens to be admitted to the destination country will she in fact migrate.
Thus, conditional on not having emigrated in period 1, the agent will realize an
expected second period payo given by
p(w
+
2
 m):
To determine the optimal migration decision in period 1, the payo from
migrating immediately is compared to the payo from staying in period 1 and
emigrating in period 2 in case the high income dierential is realized. Discounting
the second period payo, the condition for moving in period 1 is
23
w
1
+
Ew
2
1 + r
 m 
p(w
+
2
 m)
1 + r
: (1)
20
This assumption merely serves to keep the presentation as simple as possible. More gen-
erally, a positive mass of agents with moving costs lower (higher) than the low (high) income
dierential could be allowed for. Under assumptions weaker than inequalities (2) below, all
such individuals would emigrate in the rst period (never emigrate). The comparative statics
eects derived in subsection 3.2 remain unchanged.
21
We do not allow for return migration. Thus, an agent who emigrates in period 1 also stays
in the destination country in period 2. This simplication is a slight departure from reality, as
is shown by the evidence on some Turkish immigrants to Germany. Most of these, however,
return home for retirement. We abstract from this in order to avoid modeling a life cycle savings
decision (see Dustmann (1995) for a treatment of this issue). A possible justication may be
that return migration is costly, too, and that this prevents agents from choosing this option.
22
This amounts to saying that the EU does not send home citizens of the accession countries
who already reside in the Community if accession nally is denied.
23
For simplicity, we assume that an agent moves whenever she is indierent to both choices.
7
Let m

be the solution of (1) as an equality. From p=(1+r) < 1, we have (1)
with a strict inequality if m < m

, whereas (1) is false for all m > m

: Thus, all
agents with moving costs equal or less than m

will emigrate in the rst period.
Agents whose moving costs exceed m

will stay until period 2 and then leave the
origin country if and only if the income dierential is high.
Usually, it makes sense to emigrate immediately, because one can enjoy the
income dierential twice and must bear the moving costs only once. However,
for some individuals, it pays to wait and see. Agents with a high value of moving
costs would stay at home forever if they knew that the income dierential will
remain small, and they would emigrate immediately if it were sure that the income
dierential will be high. Consequently, such individuals stay and reconsider their
decision in the second period. As in the model by Burda (1995), uncertainty
about the future income dierential creates an option value of postponing the
emigration decision.
3.2 Policy evaluation
In the context of the present model, accession of the origin country to the EU can
aect the immigration decision through three dierent eects. Firstly, prospects
on living standards in the origin country may improve according to the hypoth-
esis of catching-up and convergence clubs. Secondly, moving costs are reduced,
for example because the legal systems are harmonized, or because educational
certicates are acknowledged. Finally, the right to migration between the EU
member states is guaranteed by the European treaties, the risk of a closure of
the border thus being eliminated.
The eects of the rst two policy changes are well-established in migration
theory,
24
we therefore restrict ourselves to reporting the main results.
25
A suc-
cessful catching up process of the origin country may be modeled as a decrease
in p, indicating that the bad state of nature becomes less likely. In this case,
immigration becomes less attractive in the rst period as the expected income
dierential decreases. Some agents will therefore postpone their decision to the
second period. In addition, as the bad state of nature is less probable, it is less
likely that these agents will decide to emigrate in the second period. Improved
income prospects in the origin country therefore lead to a decrease in immigra-
tion in the rst period, and also reduce the total expected number of immigrants
present in the destination country at the end of period 2.
Consider now a change in moving costs. One expects that a decrease in moving
costs leads to increased immigration in the rst period and to an increase in the
total number of immigrants. A way to formalize this is to change the distribution
function of m in the sense of rst order stochastic dominance, i.e. low moving
24
cf. e.g. Burda (1995), Siebert (1993).
25
The formal proofs may be obtained from the authors upon request.
8
costs become more probable.
26
As can be shown, this has indeed the plausible
eect of increasing migration.
We nally turn to the destination country's immigration policy, formally rep-
resented by the parameter : In particular,  = 1 if the origin country is a
member of the EU due to the EU treaty grant of free movement. On the other
hand, if the origin country is not a member of the EU immigration may well be
restricted , implying  < 1. We thus associate the refusal of EU membership to
the Eastern European countries with a decrease in  below unity.
In order to focus on the interesting case where marginal policy changes can
aect the migration decision at all, we restrict attention to parameter values
which satisfy
Assumption f(m

) > 0:
Since the density function is positive only for moving costs between the low
and the high second period income dierential, the assumption implies that
w
 
2
< m

< w
+
2
: (2)
Thus, our assumption essentially states that the good and bad states of nature
in the origin country dier substantially. The low income dierential has to be
quite small, while the high one is supposed to be very high.
Applying the implicit function theorem to (1) we obtain
dm

d 
=  
p(w
+
2
 m

)
1 + r   
< 0:
For the number of immigrants in the rst period this implies
dF (m

)
d 
= f(m

)
dm

d 
< 0 (3)
and in the second period
d fp[1  F (m

)]g
d 
= p[1  F (m

)]  pf(m

)
dm

d 
> 0: (4)
The expected total number of immigrants changes according to
p[1  F (m

)] + (1  p)f(m

)
dm

d 
:
The sign of this derivative may not be determined without further assumptions.
However, if the distribution of moving costs is uniform with density f(m)  f ,
26
Thus, a distribution function G(m) is said to display smaller moving costs than F (m) if
G(m) > F (m) for all m such that 1 > G(m); F (m) > 0:
9
it simplies to
pf  (w
+
2
 m

) + (1  p)f 
dm

d 
= pf  (w
+
2
 m

)
 
1 
1  p
1 + r   p
!
: (5)
From r > 0; this expression is positive. Thus, (3), (4) and (5) yield
Proposition 1 If the probability of an open border in the second period increases,
the number of immigrants decreases in the rst period and increases in the second
period. If moving costs are uniformly distributed, the total expected number of
immigrants increases.
This proposition points out the way immigration policy of the destination country
may aect the option value of waiting. If the probability that migration in the
future will still be an option increases, waiting becomes more valuable. This,
in turn, induces some agents to stay in order to use the information on second
period incomes for their decision. By contrast, if  declines it must be feared
that this information will be worthless because immigration may be prohibited.
In this case, more immediate immigration will be triggered.
Occasionally it has been claimed that immigration imposes costs on the host
country. Although this concern is not necessarily well founded, for the sake of
argument we assume that every immigrant causes costs amounting to c for the
destination country in the arrival period. For an example of such costs we might
refer to language training that must be provided to newly arrived immigrants.
In this case the expected present value of these costs is
cF (m

) + c
p[1  F (m

)]
1 + r
:
Taking the derivative with respect to  and assuming that moving costs are
uniformly distributed, we obtain
cf 

1 
p
1 + r

dm

d 
+ cf 
p
1 + r
(w
+
2
 m

):
Inserting dm

=d  and collecting terms shows that this derivative is zero. Hence
we have
Proposition 2 Assume that immigrants impose a constant per capita cost on
the host country in the period of arrival. Then the expectation of the present
value of these costs is unaected by a change in the probability of admission of
immigrants in the second period.
10
However, it might also be argued that immigration is benecial for the desti-
nation country, e.g. because immigrants bring in new ideas. As Proposition 2
is independent of the sign of c, the present value of such benets is unaected
by a change in the frontier regime occurring in period 2. Thus, Proposition 1
essentially features a shift in the timing of immigration rather than a genuine
change in aggregate ows.
Combining the three eects of EU enlargement, we see that two of them
favour lower rst period immigration, while only one of them works towards
increased immediate immigration. Of course, it is possible that reduced moving
costs will outweigh the aggregate eect of improved economic perspectives and
reduced fear of a closed border. Nevertheless, the results of this section cast
doubt on the vision that granting the Eastern European countries accession to
the EU will result in tremendous inows of Eastern European immigrants. This
is particularly true in the short run that politicians thinking in electoral cycles
are mainly concerned with. But even in the long run, a strong positive eect of
EU enlargement on immigration is not obvious from a theoretical point of view.
In particular, the clear prospect of EU membership should strengthen the hope
of substantially better living conditions in these countries, thus inducing their
citizens to postpone emigration plans, and possibly cancelling them for good.
4 Development of per capita income and mi-
gration ows after EU accession: Experiences
from the EU South enlargement
In order to get an idea of the consequences of a possible EU East enlargement it
may be instructive to draw from the experiences gained following the EU South
enlargement in the 1980s. In the run-up to the EU accession of Spain, Por-
tugal and Greece similar fears of imminent uncontrolled migration ows were
expressed.
27
We therefore examine as a case study the development of economic
growth and migration ows of these countries after their admission to the EU.
28
Consider rst the issue of convergence of per capita incomes. With regard to the
most frequently reported relative convergence the relevant gure is the develop-
ment of real per capita incomes of Spain, Portugal and Greece divided by the
average real per capita income of the original six EU member countries.
27
See, for example, Eckstein (1982), Klauder (1983).
28
A similar reasoning has recently been put forward by Straubhaar (1998).
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Figure 1. Sources of data: OECD (1999), Maddison (1995), Statistisches Bundesamt (1999),
own calculations.
Figure 1 shows that Portugal and Spain have experienced a steady increase in
this ratio since the early 1960s. Remarkably, after a period of stagnation in the
early 1980s, this convergence has regained impetus following the EU accession in
1986. By contrast, for Greece since about 1980 a stagnation in relative per capita
income is observable. Thus, at least in Spain and Portugal, EU membership seems
to have spurred economic growth.
With respect to the development of migration ows, complete data on the
number of migrants from Southern Europe to the remaining EU countries are
only available for Spain but not for Portugal and Greece. The following diagram
shows the total number of Spanish emigrants to Europe between 1970 and 1996:
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Figure2. Source of data: Espa~na, Anuario Estad

istico, various issues.
In this gure, migration ows are contrasted with the milestones of Spain's
integration into the EU.
29
These events are the free trade agreement between
Spain and the European Economic Community in 1969, Spain's application for
membership in 1977, the beginning of the negotiations in 1979 and accession to
the European Community in 1986. Generally, emigration from Spain to the rest
of Europe has diminished rather than increased. In fact, a few years after the
establishment of the free trade area the number of emigrants per year dropped
from over 200,000 in 1970 to less than 120,000 in the late 1970s and since then has
continued to decline. Since the beginning of the 1990s the number of emigrants
from Spain to Europe has leveled o at about 2,000 to 3,000 per year.
Data on total net migration are available for all three Southern European
countries. With regard to Spain and Portugal data for the period from 1970 to
1996 yield the following picture:
29
For the year 1983 no comparable data on total emigration are available.
13
Figure 3. Source of data: Eurostat (1999).
Figure 3 gives the dierence between immigration and emigration for each
year since 1960. In both countries, no drastic increases in net migration after
joining the EU are observable. With regard to Portugal in particular total net
emigration has clearly declined since the 1970s. Moreover Portuguese as well as
Spanish migration numbers gained constancy after the commencement of mem-
bership negotiations. During the 1990s both Spain and Portugal even became
immigration countries.
The decline in net emigration is even more obvious in the case of Greece:
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Figure 4. Source of data: Eurostat (1999).
The diagram shows that in the aftermath of her EU membership application
and commencement of membership negotiations Greece evolved from an emigra-
tion country to an immigration country.
In all three countries, the application for EU membership was preceded by
the fall of dictatorships. In the aftermath of these events in the mid-70s, net em-
igration declined sharply in Greece and in particular in Portugal. This supports
the hypothesis put forward in section 2 according to which the establishment of
a democratic regime reduces emigration. Thus, the drop in emigration gures in
the late 70s cannot be attributed uniquely to EU membership. However, politi-
cal integration into Europe has probably helped to stabilize the new democracies
and thus contributed to keeping emigration numbers low. Finally, it must be ob-
served that the peak in net immigration into Portugal in 1975 also reects people
returning from the former colonies which had gained independence shortly after
the Portuguese revolution. Similarly, there was substantial relocation of ethnic
Greeks from the Soviet Union in the early 70s. Nevertheless, Portuguese and
Greek emigration numbers in the 80s have stayed below their pre-application
levels.
Based on an analogy with the Turkish immigration to Germany, and using
the wage gaps between Germany and Turkey in the 1960s, Sinn (1999) estimates
the number of future immigrants from Eastern Europe at 4 million. While we
refrain from drawing any quantitative conclusions from the casual facts presented
in this section, the experiences from the EU South enlargement suggest that
15
such a number is exaggerated. Instead, these observations support the reasoning
put forward in sections 2 and 3 implying that EU membership by no means
necessarily induces uncontrolled immigration into the core EU member states.
On the contrary, in the aftermath of their EU accessions net emigration from all
three Southern European states has substantially declined.
5 Conclusion
In this paper the impact of the future enlargement of the EU on East-West migra-
tion has been discussed. Beyond the mere reduction of moving costs we identied
several eects of EU membership that may inuence migration decisions. With-
out a clear prospect of accession, residents of Eastern Europe might emigrate
immediately for fear of a more restrictive border regime in the future. Addi-
tionally, membership is likely to favour convergence of per capita incomes and
enhance political and social stability, thus reducing the incentives to emigrate.
This reasoning shows that the emigration decision is complex. We therefore con-
clude that immigration to the EU will not necessarily be as high as some estimates
suggest. In any case, a detailed empirical investigation into the determinants of
emigration decisions is highly desirable.
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